

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

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R 221320Z JUL 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6862

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4035

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: WG CHAIRMAN'S DISCUSSION PAPER ON IMPLICATIONS OF  
REVISED DATA IN RELATION TO GROUND FORCE DEFINITION ISSUE

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF SUBJECT PAPER WHICH ON JULY 16 WG  
ASKED STAFF GROUP TO PREPARE AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT JULY  
30 WG MEETING (DETAILS IN REPORTING SEPTEL). AS POINTED OUT  
IN CHAIRMAN'S TERMS OF REFERENCE PAPER (TEXT SEPTEL) COMMENTS  
FROM CAPITALS WOULD BE APPRECIATED BY JULY 25.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF COVER NOTE:

SUBJECT: MBFR. A REVIEW OF SOME ANOMALIES IN THE  
FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

ONE. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS A DRAFT NOTE ON THE ABOVE  
SUBJECT, PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE MBFR  
WORKING GROUP AT THEIR MEETING ON 16 JULY 74 (SEE REFERENCE B  
ABOVE). IT IS INTENDED ONLY AS A FOCUS FOR CONSIDERATION BY

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THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IN THEIR EXAMINATION OF THE MILITARY/  
TECHINCAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR ADJUSTMENT OF  
ANOMALIES IN THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS  
CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A ABOVE.

END TEXT OF COVER NOTE.

BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT WG REPORT:

SUBJECT: A REVIEW OF SOME ANOMOLIES IN THE FORCES TO  
BE ADDRESSED IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS:

NOTE BY THE STAFF GROUP

1. IN THEIR REPORT (1) TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON  
3 JULY 74, THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA REQUESTED GUIDANCE ON THE  
PROBLEM OF ADJUSTING THE CURRENT ALLIED DEFINITION OF  
GROUND FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF  
ACTUAL ANOMALIES BETWEEN THE NATO AND WP FORCES. THE AD HOC  
GROUP REQUESTED EXAMINATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS  
OF THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE ILLUSTRATIVE ADJUSTMENT OF  
ANOMALIES:

A. FIRST POSSIBILITY. EXCLUSION FROM THE WP GROUND FORCES  
TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTION OF: POLISH AND DZECHE NATIONAL  
AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL (41,000) SERVING IN THE POLISH AND DZECHE  
ARMIES. INCLUSION OF THE WP AIR FORCE PERSONNEL (13,000)  
SERVING IN HELICOPTER UNITS IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES.

B. SECOND POSSIBILITY. THE ADJUSTMENT AT A. ABOVE, PLUS  
THE EXCLUSION OF AIR DEFENSE ARMY PERSONNEL ORGANIC TO THE  
NATO AND WP ARMIES, 14,000 AND ESTIMATED (1)(2) AT 13,000  
RESPECTIVELY. THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO EXCLUSION OF ALL AIR DEFENCE  
PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES MANNING AIR DEFENCE GROUND SYSTEMS  
IN THE NGA.

C. THIRD POSSIBILITY. INCLUSION IN THE NATO GROUND FORCE  
MANPOWER TOTALS, OF FRG AIR FORCE PERSONNEL (3,700) MANNING  
SSM (PERSHING) UNITS.

2. THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, IN AGREEING THAT THE  
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MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE POSSIBILITIES AT PARA  
1 ABOVE SHOULD BE EXAMINED BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, ALSO  
INDICATED THAT THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL EXAMINATION SHOULD BE  
EXTENDED TO:

BEGIN FOOTNOTE:

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(1) WCA/IS/156/74  
(2) THIS ESTIMATE IS DERIVED FROM AHG VIENNA MESSAGE AT (1).  
THE ASSESSMENT IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER SCRUTINY.

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END FOOTNOTE

A. FOURTH POSSIBILITY. THE POSSIBILITY, ALSO MENTIONED IN THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT (1) OF 3 JULY 74, OF INCLUDING, FOR BOTH WP AND NATO GROUND FORCES, ALL AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL, WHETHER ARMY OR AIR FORCE, WHO MAN GROUND SYSTEMS. THIS WOULD ADD 29,000 NATO AIRMEN TO THE NATO FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN REDUCTIONS AND 11,000 WP (GDR) AIRMEN TO THE WP FORCES.

B. ANY VARIENTS OF THE POSSIBILITIES LISTED AT 1A.-C. AND 2A. ABOVE WHICH MAY BE PUT FORWARD; AND ANY OTHER POSSIBILITIES WHICH MAY BE SUGGESTED.

3. THIS NOTE DUSCUSSES TH ILLUSTRATIVE POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS OF ANOMALIES, AS LISTED AT PARA 1 AND PARA 2A. ABOVE, FROM THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT. IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE POLITICAL NOR THE NEGOTIATING CONSIDERATIONS.

4. FOR EASE OF REFERENCE, THE MATHEMATICAL EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSALS ARE SET OUT IN TABULAR FORM AT ANNEXES (TO FOLLOW BY BAG).

#### FIRST AND SECOND POSSIBILITIES

5. THE FIRST AND SECOND POSSIBILITIES HAVE IN COMMON:

A. THE EXCLUSION OF ALL CSSR AND POLISH NATIONAL AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL SERVING IN DZ AND POLISH ARMIES.

B. THE INCLUSION OF WP AIR FORCE PERSONNEL SERVING IN HELICOPTER UNITS SUPPORTING GROUND FORCES.

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THE TWO POSSIBILITIES DIFFER ONLY IN THAT THE SECOND WOULD, ADDITIONALLY, EXCLUDE NATO AND WP ARMY AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL, NORMALLY REGARDED AS ORGANIC TO FIELD FORCES, FROM THE GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS.

BEGIN FOOTNOTE:

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(1) WCA/IS/156/74

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END FOOTNOTE

6. THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND ALTERNATIVES ARE:

A. THE MATHMATICAL EFFECTS ON THE NUMBERS OF MEN OF GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN REDUCTIONS, AND OF THE CONSEQUENTIAL CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF REDUCTIONS BY BOTH SIDES.

B. THE IMPACT OF THESE ILLUSTRATIVE POSSIBILITIES ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

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C. ANY FACTORS, DERIVING FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSALS,  
BEARING ON ALLIED CONCEPTS OF VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

D. FINALLY, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE EFFECTS ON ALLIED  
SECURITY AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE POSSIBILITIES.

7. IN MATHEMATICAL TERMS, THE FIRST AND SECOND POSSIBILITIES  
WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING EFFECTS ON THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED  
AS GROUNDFORCES FOR REDUCTIONS:

	EXISTING	FIRST	SECOND
CONCEPT		ALTERNATIVE	ALTERNATIVE
NATO	791,000	791,000	770,000
WP	952,000	924,000	911,000

(USING THE FIGURES DECLARED BY NATO AS AT OCTOBER 73 THE EFFECTS  
WOULD BE:

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NATO	777,000	777,000	763,000
WP	925,000	897,000	884,000

8. BOTH POSSIBILITIES WOULD REDUCE GROSS TOTALS OF THE WP FORCES  
TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS BY ABOUT 27,000. THE RESIDUAL WP  
FORCES, POST-MBFR WOULD BE HIGHER THAN HITHERTO ENVISAGED. THUS:

A. THE COMMON CEILING, IF ACHIEVED, WOULD BE VALID ONLY IN THE SENSE THAT IT WOULD APPLY TO THE GROUND FORCES AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AS THOSE TO BE ADDRESSED IN REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD NOT EMBRACE ALL THE GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

B. THE EFFECTS ON WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS OF GROUND COMBAT FORCES WOULD VARY DEPENDING ON THE APPROACH DURING NEGOTIATIONS. UNDER THE FIRST PHASE APPROACH, AS CURRENTLY ENVISAGED, THE FORCE REDUCTIONS BY THE SOVIETS (ONE TANK ARMY) WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE FIRST ILLUSTRATIVE POSSIBILITY. UNDER THE SECOND POSSIBILITY THE SOVIETS COULD LEAVE IN SITU# THE AREA AIR DEFENCE ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THAT TANK ARMY.

C. THE FIRST POSSIBILITY WOULD NOT AFFECT THE NATO TROOP REDUCTION, NOR NATO RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS AS COMPARED WITH THE CURRENT CONCEPT. THE SECOND, BY EXCLUDING 14,000 NATO AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL OF NATO ARMIES FROM THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS TO BE EFFECTED BY NATO:

D. UNDER BOTH POSSIBILITIES, THE ELEMENTS WITHDRAWN FROM THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED ARE PERSONNEL MANNING GROUND/AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS. THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE ALLIED APPROACH IS TO REDUCE THE CONFRONTATION IN TERMS OF GROUND FORCES BY ACHIEVING LARGE SCALE WITHDRAWALS OF SOVIET ARMOURED FORCES. CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THAT PRIMARY AIM, THE EXCLUSION OF GROUND TO AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL FROM THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED WOULD NOT ERODE THE ALLIED POSITION. INDEED, IT COULD CONCENTRATE ATTENTION MORE DIRECTLY ON THE FORCES THE ALLIES WOULD MOST WISH TO REDUCE.

E. UNDER BOTH POSSIBILITIES, THE SUGGESTED REMOVAL OF ANOMALIES WOULD CREATE OTHER ANOMALIES. THE "GROUND FORCES" TO BE ADDRESSED WOULD NO LONGER EQUATE WITH ARMY PERSONNEL: THEY WOULD INCLUDE, FOR THE WP, AIR FORCE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED ON HELICOPTERS. WHILE IT IS APPRECIATED THAT THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA HAVE

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DECLARED THESE TO BE ARMY AVIATION AND ESSENTIALLY ELEMENTS OF THE GROUND FORCES, THEIR INCLUSION DOES INTRODUCE AN AIR ELEMENT INTO NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD BLUR THE CONCENTRATION ON ARMIES AND WHICH COULD BE EXPLOITED IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING IN OTHER ELEMENTS OF AIR FORCES.

#### VERIFICATION

9. THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS FOR ALLIES WOULD NOT BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY EITHER THE FIRST OR SECOND POSSIBILITY, IF IMPLEMENTED.

#### CIRCUMVENTION

10. THE FIRST POSSIBILITY WOULD PROVIDE NO ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE WP TO CIRCUMVENT AN MBFR AGREEMENT. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY WOULD AS STRESSED BY THE AD HOC GROUP(1), PROVIDE SUCH AN OPENING: THERE WOULD BE NO LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF WP

ARMY PERSONNEL CLASSIFIED AS AID DEFENCE TROOPS. IT IS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT A DELIBERATE CIRCUMVENTION, IN THE TERMS THAT THE NAME WERE TO BE USED AS COVER FOR OTHER COMBAT FORCES, WOULD BE IDENTIFIED QUICKLY.

THE THIRD POSSIBILITY, MENTIONED IN THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT(2) OF 3 JULY 74, WOULD INCLUDE, IN THE TOTALS OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED ON BOTH SIDES, ALL AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES, WHO MAN GROUND SYSTEMS. THE EFFECT MATHEMATICALLY, WOULD BE:

INCLUSION OF AIRMEN

FIGURES AT FIGURES AT IN AIR DEFENCE  
31.18.73 MID-74 GROUND SYSTEMS  
NATO 777,000 791,000 806,000/820,000  
WP 932,000 952,000 943,000/963,000  
DISPARITY 145,000 161,000 137,000/143,000

12. IF THE ALLIES WERE TO DECLARE THE REVISED NATO GROUND FORCE ESTIMATES, INCLUDING THE 29,000 AIRMEN, AND ADHERE TO THE ANNOUNCED AIM OF A COMMON CEILING AT ABOUT 700,000 THEY WOULD IN EFFECT BE DECLARING WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE BY ABOUT 120,000. THE AIR FORCE ELEMENTS FROM WHICH THE ADDITIONAL NUMBERS DERIVE COULD PROBABLY NOT SUSTAIN A REDUCTION HIGHER THAN 10 PCT (SAY 3,000) AND REMAIN EFFICIENT. SOME 90 PCT OF THE ADDITIONAL NUMBER WOULD HAVE TO BE BORNE BY THE GROUND FORCES THEMSELVES - A TOTAL REDUCTION OF ABOUT 115,000 OUT OF AN ACTUAL PEACETIME STANDING FORCE OF

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701,000 - OR 15 PCT.

13. UNDER PRESENT NATO PROPOSALS, 29,000 OF THE TOTAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE BORNE BY THE US ARMY IN PHASE 1 IN THE FORM OF A THIN-OUT OR LOWERING OF MANNING LEVELS ONLY. THIS AMOUNTS TO 9 PCT OF ALL NATO FOREIGN STATIONED FORCES IN THE NGA AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN STATIONED FORCES WITHIN THE CONCEPT THAT TOTAL STATIONED FORCES SHOULD NOT EXCEED ABOUT 10 PCT. THE PERCENTAGE OF US FORCES INVOLVED IS 15 PCT, BUT THIS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF:

A. THE WITHDRAWAL IS BY THIN-OUT ONLY, UNITS AND EQUIPMENT REMAINING INTACT.

B. THE VERY HIGH CURRENT MANNING LEVELS OF US FORCES (97 PCT) AS RELATED TO AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS.

C. THE HIGH DEGREE OF WAR READINESS OF THE US 7TH ARMY.

14. TO REACH A HYPOTHETICAL COMMON CEILING AT 700,000, A FURTHER REDUCTION OF 91,000 WOULD BE REQUIRED. THIS CUT, IF APPLIED TO NON-US FORCES WOULD PRODUCE VERY DIFFERENT RESULTS:

A. A THIN-OUT IS MOST UNLIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED.

B. THE CUTS WOULD APPLY ALMOST IN THEIR ENTIRETY, UNDER CURRENT CONCEPTS, TO BE, GE AND BL GROUND FORCES. THESE TOTAL 474,000: 91,000 WOULD AMOUNT TO 19.2 PCT OF THESE BE, GE, BL FORCES.

THE INTRODUCTION OF AIR ELEMENTS INTO NEGOTIATIONS  
15. AS INDICATED ABOVE THE INTRODUCTION INTO NEGOTIATIONS OF AIRMEN WHO CARRY OUT ARMY TASKS (E.G. GROUND TO AIR DEFENCES) WOULD NOT, PER SE, HAVE ANY SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON THE ALLIES' CONCEPT OF MBFR, PROVIDED THAT THE LIMIT OF 10 PCT ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTION IS SUSTAINED. THE EFFECTS, IF THE TARGET OF A COMMON CEILING AT 700,000 WERE MAINTAINED, WOULD BE SERIOUS FOR NATO.

16. THE INTRODUCTION OF SOME AIR ELEMENTS INTO THE EQUATION WOULD PROBABLY BRING INTO QUESTION AND DISCUSSION OTHER AIR ELEMENTS.  
THE TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA HAVE THREE

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MAIN ROLES (COUNTER-AIR; AIR DEFENCE; CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES). THE LAST OF THESE IS STRICTLY AND SOLELY RELATED TO GROUND FORCES. THE OTHER TWO ROLES ARE SPECIFICALLY, ALTHOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVELY, DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE WEIGHT OF WP AIR ATTACK ON NATO INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES. THE FIRST ROLE (COUNTER AIR) MUST BE CONSIDERED IN BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL TERMS.

NOTE BY OCT: #AS RECEIVED.

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17. THE ELEMENTS WHICH, IT IS SUGGESTED, MIGHT BE COUNTED AS GROUND FORCES (29,000) DERIVE FROM GROUND AIR DEFENCES (AAA AND MISSILES). FUNCTIONAL DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN THESE AND OTHER AIR FORCE ELEMENTS ARE DIFFICULT TO DRAW IN LOGIC. THE AAA AND SAM FORMATION HAVE THE SAME PRIMARY FUNCTION AS DEFENSIVE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

THE FRG SSMN (PERSHING PERSONNEL)

18. THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA SUGGEST (1) THAT AT SOME FUTURE POINT, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE FOR THE ALLIES TO DISCUSS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING FRG SSM (PERSHING) PERSONNEL IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL ON THE ALLIED SIDE. THE AD HOC GROUP MAKE THE POINTS THAT:

A. THE FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL (3,700) ARE THE SOLE ANOMALY (I.E. AIR FORCE MANNED) AMONG SSM PERSONNEL IN THE NGA.

B. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IS RELATIVELY SMALL. THE WP HAVE SECRET

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A STRONG OBJECTIVE CASE FOR THEIR INCLUSION IN ALLIED FIGURES.

C. INCLUSION OF THIS FRG ELEMENT NEED NOT OPEN THE WAY FOR GENERAL INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL, BECAUSE IT CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ARGUED THAT THE ALLIES HAD REDRESSED A UNIQUE ANOMALY.

19. IT IS AGREED THAT ONLY THE FRG USES AIRMEN TO MAN SSMS PER SE. (HOWEVER, NIKE, PRIMARILY A SAM, HAS A SSM CAPABILITY, WHILE ITS USE IN THE SSM ROLE IS PERHAPS A REMOTE POSSIBILITY, THE FACT THAT THE THEORETICAL CAPABILITY EXISTS COULD BE EXPLOITED, TO BRING INTO THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED THE ALLIED AIRMEN MANNING NIKE ELEMENTS).

20. AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, IN REDRESSING CERTAIN ANOMALIES, THE ILLUSTRATIVE POSSIBILITIES PUT FORWARD BY THE AD HOC GROUP CREATE OTHERS. THESE COULD BE CUMULATIVE: SOME SOLDIERS WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE WP GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED: SOME AIRMEN (HELICOPTER PERSONNEL) WOULD BE ADDED. IF THE THIRD POSSIBILITY WERE ADOPTED, OTHER AIRMEN WOULD BE INJECTED, ON BOTH SIDES. THE TERM 'GROUND FORCES' COULD CEASE TO HAVE ANY FIRM VALIDITY IN ITS COMMON SENSE - OF ARMY PERSONNEL, UNITS AND FORMATIONS. THE WP COULD EXPLOIT THIS TO PRESS THEIR PERSISTENT CLAIM THAT GROUND/AIR FORCES ARE MUTUALLY INTERDEPENDENT AND, FUNDAMENTALLY, PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED DEFENSE CAPABILITY: AND SHOULD BE SO ADDRESSED.

21. IN SECURITY TERMS; THE ADDITION OF THE GRG PERSHING PERSONNEL TO THE 'GROUND FORCES' ON THE ALLIED SIDE WOULD RAISE THE ALLIED

NUMBERS TO BE ADDRESSED BY 3,700. THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE DONE, IF AT ALL, AFTER THE ALLIED CONCESSION, ENVISAGED IN THE FIRST TWO POSSIBILITIES, THAT SOME OF ALL WP ARMY PERSONNEL EMPLOYED ON GROUND TO AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED. THE ALLIED MANPOWER TOTAL WOULD THUS RISE TO 795,000, WHILE THE WP COUNT (ON NATO ASSESSMENTS) COULD HAVE REDUCTED TO 911,000 - OR SUCH LOWER FIGURE AS THE WP COULD SUBSTANTIATE.

CONCLUSIONS

22. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT:

A. THE FIRST AND SECOND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES LISTED BY  
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THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA WOULD BE TECHNICALLY PRACTICAL. IN SECURITY TERMS, EITHER ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TOLERABLE SINCE THE FORCES (CZ/POL GROUND SYSTEMS IN AREA AND DEFENCE) DO NOT CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO THE GROUND FORCE CONFRONTATION. THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF REDUCING THAT CONFRONTATION BY ACHIEVING WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET ARMOURED FORCES WOULD NOT BE ERODED.

B. THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE IS PREFERABLE ON BALANCE, TO THE SECOND. THE LATTER SIGNLES OUT ORGANIC ELEMENTS OF ARMIES INTO A SPECIAL CATEGORY (DIFFICULT TO SUBSTANTIATE OR IMPLEMENT PRACTICALLY), AND SECONLDY, IT OFFERS OPPORTUNITY FOR CIRCUMVENTION.

C. THE THIRD POSSIBILITY, BY INCREASING SUBSTANTIALLY THE NATO FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED, RAISES PROBLEMS, FIRST OF THE SCALE OF REDUCTIONS IN RELATION TO THE COMMON CEILING TARGET, AND SECONLDY BY INTRODUCING AIRFORCE ELEMENTS HITHERTO EXCLUDED.

D. THE FOURTH POSSIBILITY, THE INCLUSION OF FRG-SSM PERSONNEL IN THE NATO FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IS SUBJECT TO BREADLY THE SAME OBJECTION, ALBEIT ON A LESSER NUMERICAL SCALE, AS C. ABOVE.

E. THE FOUR POSSIBILITIES VISUALISED, WOULD OPERATE TO REDUCE THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROSS MANPOWER COUNTS OF NATO AND PACT FORCES.

F. ALL FOUR POSSIBILITIES HAVE THE EFFECT, IN VARYING DEGREES, OF BLURRING THE PRESENT CLEAR NATO DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES - THOSE IN THE ARMY - AND THEREFORE OPEN THE WAY TO THE WP ARGUMENT THAT ALL FORCES, BECAUSE THEY ARE SO INTERWOVEN IN COMBAT ROLES, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. END TEXT OF DRAFT WG REPORT. RUMSFELD

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RELATION TO GROUND FORCE

**To:** STATE  
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LONDON  
MBFR VIENNA  
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